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CASE NOTES
The difficulties inherent in applying a test of motive—personal gain
rather than policy considerations—is well documented in the context of the
expenditure of corporate funds in proxy contests.18 It would seem that
directors should be able "in the exercise of an honest business judgment" to
adopt "a valid method of eliminating what appears to them a clear threat
to the future of their business." 19 This does not give the directors an "un-
controllable" weapon against shareholder challenge, yet it achieves what
are here suggested to be desirable ends. The corporation will not be forced to
engage in costly and most often wasteful proxy fights in the name of
furthering corporate democracy; it would not, under the facts of the case at
bar, have to wait until the raider obtained a foothold in the company and im-
proved his bargaining position for the ultimate "sell-out"; it could eliminate
a dissentient faction for valid business purposes. At the same time, the court
would not have foreclosed the possibility of an independent inquiry into the
actions of the incumbent management if plaintiff could show fraud, bad
faith or misconduct.
NORMAN I. JACOBS
Labor Law—Collective Bargaining Agreements—Procedural Arbitra-
tion.—Livingston v. John Wiley El Sons, Inc.'—District 65, Retail, Whole-
sale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, on the basis of a collective
bargaining agreement with Tnterscience Publishing, Inc., brought an action
to compel arbitration on disputes arising over seniority rights, pension plans,
job security and severance and vacation pay, against John Wiley & Sons, a
successor corporation of a consolidation between Interscience and Wiley. It
was undisputed that no notice of any grievance was filed within the four-week
period required by the collective bargaining agreement, nor were any of
the procedures established in the agreement followed? The district court,
assuming that the consolidation did not terminate the agreement, denied
the motion to arbitrate on the grounds that the agreement should be so
construed as "to exclude from arbitration matters involving the entire
collective bargaining unit, as distinguished from the individuals comprising
it;" and that even if not so limited, the Union failed to avail itself of the
grievance procedure described in the agreement and thus abandoned any
rights it might have had to arbitrate the dispute The Court of Appeals
12 See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F.
Delaware law); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas
1944).
12 McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co., 257
Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 Atl.
10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 Atl. 255 (1914).
Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying
Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649, 651 (D. Del.
F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958) ; Davis v. Louisville
654 (1928); In re International Radiator Co.,   
313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 373 U.S. 908 (1963).
2 The collective bargaining agreement set forth "procedures, which shall be
resorted to as the sole' means of obtaining adjustment of the difference, grievance, or
dispute" between Interscience and the Union. In another clause, the agreement stated
that "notice of any grievance must be filed with the Employer and with the Union
Shop SteWard within four (4) weeks after its occurrence or latest existence. The failure
by either party to file the grievance within this time limitation shall be construed and
be deemed to be an abandonment of the grievance." Id, at 64.
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for the Second Circuit reversed. HELD: Certain rights within the col-
lective bargaining agreement survived consolidation, and failure to comply
with the requirements of the agreement relative to grievance procedure are
matters to be decided by the arbitrator and not the court. 3
The court reasoned that substantive arbitrability and procedural arbi-
trability were separate and distinct matters.* It stated that the only issue
for the court to decide is whether the reluctant party has breached his
promise to arbitrate. Once a determination is made that the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract,
or that the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance, or did agree
to give the arbitrator power to make the award, the reason for considera-
tion of the matter by the court is exhausted.
Since the Lincoln Mills 5 decision, the courts have been trying to effec-
tuate a "federal common law" which would bind parties to their arbitration
agreements. At the same time, the courts have been trying to take into con-
sideration and to make a determination as to what the parties have agreed
to arbitrate. In this very determination, the courts have sought to refrain
from performing the duties of the arbitrator which would deprive the parties
of what they have intended—namely, arbitration.
The judicial system has been leaning toward the thesis expressed by
Professor Cox,
that the conventional arbitration clause limiting the arbitrator to
disputes concerning "interpretation and application" of the con-
tract reserves the right to judicial determination over the subject
matter but that all other questions—procedural, jurisdictional or
substantive are solely within the power of the arbitrator to deter-
mine.°
The Supreme Court has held' in part, that this theory restricts the tradi-
tional contract approach° in collective bargaining agreements by holding
that "in the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here,
It is this latter point which the author will consider since there have been a
number of recent conflicting cases dealing with the subject.
4 The court necessarily had to draw this distinction in order to avoid the authority
of Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, at 241 (1962) which holds that arbitra-
tion is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
disputes which he has not agreed to so submit. See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, at 582 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, at 570 (1960) (concurring opinion).
5 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
6 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 at 1511 (1959).
See also Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
247 (1958).
7 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 4; United Steel-
workers v, American Mfg. Co., supra note 4.
8 As expressed in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App.
Div. 917, at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947). "If the meaning of the provision of the con-
tract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate
and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration."
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the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad."° The
approach, therefore, is one which recognizes the collective bargaining agree-
ment as a contract, but of a very special type, which requires arbitration un-
less there is an explicit statement excluding the particular subject matter from
arbitration.
The court in Wiley would seem to eliminate the contract approach for
procedural matters found within the agreement." An allegation that a dis-
pute exists concerning the application of arbitration procedures within the
collective agreement does not give the court authority to deny arbitration on
a substantive matter found within the agreement." The court does not
distinguish between a frivolous claim within the scope of the contract and an
assertion that a claim is within the scope of the contract. The court pre-
cludes any examination of the procedural matters by a determination that
the substantive matter is contained within the agreement. This approach would
seem to preclude the possibility of the parties contracting procedural steps as
conditions precedent to arbitration.
The First and Seventh Circuits, whose cases" in this area pre-date the
Supreme Court's decisions in the Steelworkers" cases, hold that the pro-
cedure set down in an agreement is a condition precedent to arbitration, and
thus a matter of contract interpretation for the courts and not a matter for
the arbitrator. These courts hold that in an action to compel arbitration the
question whether the matter is arbitrable is preceded by the question whether
there is an obligation to arbitrate. These jurisdictions reason that the
industrial knowledge of an arbitrator is irrelevant in the formation of a com-
petent judgment on such procedural issues. Also, the court's expertise in con-
struing agreements seems to qualify them as the appropriate forum for
determining procedural compliance.
Wiley completely rejects this theory and maintains "that the parties
have bargained for a decision by an arbitrator because they thus have the
benefit of his creativity and expertise... ."17 It "would open the door wide to
all sorts of technical obstructionism"" and also to delay of ". . . national
labor legislation [if we promoted] the arbitral process as a substitute for
economic warfare."
Although the Steelworkers17 decisions did not get into the question of
9 United SteelWorkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 4, at 584.
10 Best evidence of this is found in the cases following Livingston v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., supra note 1; Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963); Local
748 of the Int'l Union of Eke., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Jefferson
City Cab Co., 314 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1963); Larson v. American Airlines, Inc., 313
F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1963).
11 The court cited International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238
(5th Cir. 1961) as supporting its position. However, the Court in that decision held
that the matter was for the arbitrator on an estoppel theory.
12 Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir.
1958); Brass Workers Union v. American Brass Co., 272 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1959).
15 Supra note 4.
14 Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, supra note 1, at 62.
15 Id. at 63.
16 Ibid.
17 Supra note 4.
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procedural arbitrability, there is language within those decisions to the effect
that the question of procedural arbitration should not be handled any dif-
ferently from questions of substantive arbitrability. A party may not only
wish to preclude arbitration of certain matters, but also to preclude it when
certain procedures for presenting it are not followed. The test is the same.
The court should determine whether the party seeking to bar arbitration
because of procedural non-compliance has succeeded in drafting a procedural
provision which satisfies the explicitness test.
PHILIP H. GRANDCHAMP
Labor Law—Public Utility Anti-Strike Act—Invalid Under NLRA.—
Street Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri?—On November
15, 1961, the State of Missouri brought suit to enjoin a threatened strike
by employees of the Kansas City Transit Co. which had resulted from an
impasse in collective bargaining negotiations. Pursuant to the provisions
of the King-Thompson Act,2 the Governor of Missouri had seized the transit
company on November l3,3 the day on which the strike had been called. In
so doing, the Governor proclaimed that all rules and regulations governing
the internal management and organization of the company and its duties
and responsibilities were to remain in force and effect throughout the term
of operation by the state.4 Upon seizure of the transit company by the
state, the strike became enjoinable under a provision of the act making it
unlawful to use the strike weapon as a means of enforcing demands against a
utility after possession has been taken by the states From an adverse decision
of the Missouri Supreme Court upholding an injunction, the union appealed.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States HELD:
that the Missouri statute authorizing seizure and providing for the issuance
of injunctions against strikes after seizure is in direct, conflict with federal
legislation guaranteeing the right to strike against a public utility engaged in
interstate commerce and thus invalid under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution .°
1 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 295.10,210 (1959).
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.180(1) (1959) sets forth the power of the Governor when a
utility strike threatens. The Governor is empowered where a strike "threatens to impair
the operation of the utility so as to interfere with the public interest, health and
welfare . . . to take immediate possession of the plant, equipment or facility for use
and operation by the state of Missouri in the public interest."
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.190 (1959) provides that "the governor is authorized to
prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter."
5 Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.200(1) (1959) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, employee or representative as defined in this
chapter to call, incite, support or participate in any strike or concerted refusal to
work for any utility or for the state after any plant, equipment or facility has
been taken over by the state under this chapter, as means of enforcing any de-
mands against the utility or against the state.
Mo. Rev. Stat. 295.200(6) (1959) provides that "The courts of this state shall have
power to enforce by injunction or other legal or equitable remedies any provision of this
chapter or any rule or regulation prescribed by the governor hereunder."
0 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 provides that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
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